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This paper originated as an essay written to partially fulfil the requirements of a Professional
Doctorate in Educational and Child Psychology. Trainee Educational Psychologists were in-
vited to consider the ethical questions that arise from following the moral principles that under-
pin the practice of educational psychologists, namely social justice, beneficence and autonomy.
The TEP chose to focus on social justice. This was explored by drawing on three theories or
principles: Utilitarianism, Rawlsian Redistribution and Communitarianism. These were con-
sidered within the context of the diverse communities educational psychologists work with.
Vignettes from personal and professional experiences were offered and used by the TEP to
explore the sources of her values and to consider how her identity and values influence her
work. This reflexive exercise is undertaken in the first term and in the first year of the TEP’s
training, in preparation for her becoming the ethically minded psychologist she intends to be.
Introduction
One of the main aims of the training provider’s Profes-
sional Doctorate in Educational and Child Psychology is to
enable trainees to become the psychologists that they want to
be. Having spent some years working in education prior to
starting my journey as a trainee educational psychologist, I
know that for me it is important that I make a difference to the
lives of the children and families I work with. I am also inter-
ested in the wider education system, especially as it relates
to the education of diverse communities and those from dis-
advantaged social and/or low socioeconomic groups. Of the
three moral principles that underpin the work of educational
psychologists (autonomy, beneficence and social justice) I
have chosen to focus on social justice.
Through writing this article, I hope to develop my under-
standing of some of the different theories and perspectives
on social justice and to consider how different conceptuali-
sations of social justice apply to the practice of educational
psychology. I will revisit vignettes from personal and profes-
sional experiences and apply a reflexive lens to explore the
sources of my values and consider how my values and iden-
tity have influenced my work with children and families, and
how they could impact on my practice as an educational psy-
chologist. I do so in my first year and first term as a Trainee
Educational Psychologist in preparation for the complex eth-
ical dilemmas I am likely to encounter in my practice as an
educational psychologist.
Shriberg et al. (2011) described two perspectives from
which social justice can be viewed. The first is from an indi-
vidual perspective in which just societies allow individuals to
conduct their lives with minimal intervention from the state
or formal institutions. The second takes a wider systemic
view which advocates the manipulation of social systems in
pursuit of justice. I have chosen to focus on two perspectives
of social justice that reflect these two positions. The first
is a Utilitarian perspective, and in particular, Mill’s Great-
est Happiness Principle. The second is a distributive model
based on Rawlsian principles of social justice. In addition,
I will discuss the Communitarian perspective, in recognition
of the role that communities can play in promoting social
justice.
Utilitarian Perspective of Social Justice
Utility or the Greatest Happiness Principle holds
that actions are right in proportion as they tend
to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to pro-
duce the reverse of happiness (Mill, 1861/1987,
p. 278).
According to this perspective, actions are considered eth-
ical if they engender the greatest amount of happiness for
the greatest number of people and cause the least amount of
unhappiness for the fewest number of people. Utilitarian-
ism places intrinsic value on individuals whilst it recognises
the ethical weight of multiple individuals as greater than the
weight of one individual. It focuses on outcome (happiness)
rather than intent, in contrast with deontological perspectives
which encompass concern for the adherence to rules or du-
ties that govern the way in which members of a liberal so-
ciety behave in a morally just way. Utilitarianism presents
a tension between needs and rights of the one and the many
which is played out in discussion about exclusion in schools.
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For example, teachers may say that a child has to be excluded
for the wellbeing of the other pupils. It is also written in the
SEND Code of Practice in the form of efficient use of re-
sources and the right not to name a school if a child’s atten-
dance would be incompatible with the education of others.
Recent emphasis on the promotion of wellbeing in schools
is a welcome development which adheres to Utilitarian prin-
ciples. Educational psychologists play a significant role in
promoting the wellbeing of children and advocating for chil-
dren’s rights. As an educationalist and as a parent I strongly
feel that children’s happiness, their wellbeing, is an impor-
tant and valid goal within itself, rather than just a precondi-
tion for academic achievement. But is happiness everyone’s
goal? Does everyone strive for individual success?
When my first child was born my mother, de-
lighted to meet her grandson, said a prayer in
Somali which is used when welcoming a new
baby, “May you be blessed with piety and may
you serve your people well.” I had heard this
said many times before, but I paid attention to
its meaning for the first time as a mother. Little
of my mother’s heartfelt prayer was actually for
my son as an individual.
One of the theories that I have regularly come across in my
work, particularly in the context of promoting the wellbeing
of newly arrived immigrant communities, is Maslow’s hierar-
chy of needs. According to Maslow (1943), individuals ful-
fil their potential/achieve self-actualisation when their more
basic needs are met, namely physiological, safety, belong-
ing/love and esteem. Maslow’s theory has some basis in util-
itarian thinking in that it privileges individual goals. Given
the diverse communities that educational psychologists work
with, it is worth considering whether all communities would
give self-actualisation the prominence that Maslow’s theory
does.
In action research I conducted whilst working as a class
teacher, I explored the views of Somali parents whose chil-
dren attended a primary school in an inner London Borough.
I found that parents wanted their children to succeed in their
formal education and that informal education aimed at de-
veloping religious and cultural identity and moral character
was seen as equally important, if not more, by most respon-
dents. Many children attended supplementary community
schools and/or received instruction at home. These parents
were considered “hard to reach” or less engaged by their chil-
dren’s school when their engagement was evaluated against
the school’s preconception of what an engaged parent looks
like, for example attendance at the school’s events and mem-
bership of the Parent Teacher Association. Although the So-
mali parents in the study were engaged with their children’s
education, they had values and aims that differed from the
school’s. Given that educational psychologists work with di-
verse communities and different clients (for example chil-
dren, parents and schools), the example above highlights the
importance of cultural competence. It also highlights the
complexity of identifying goals that can be considered as
beneficent. What assumptions do we make and why? When
working with multiple clients and with diverse communities,
whose values should prevail?
One of the criticisms levelled at utilitarianist principles of
social justice is the difficulty in predicting the consequences
of actions and, in particular, which actions will produce hap-
piness — the felicific calculus. Applied to educational psy-
chology, this principle would determine the justness of a psy-
chologist’s actions based on the extent to which the action
maximises utility; the consequence determines if the action
is just. Earlier, I proposed that, when determining goals, it is
important to consider differing values and cultural goals. It is
also important to acknowledge the power relations involved
in the day-to-day work of educational psychologists and the
powerful positions in which they are placed. Positioning ed-
ucational psychologists as “experts” can be problematic. Pre-
viously, I posed the question: whose values should prevail?
Positioning educational psychologists as experts negates the
need for this consideration — the expert prevails. However,
this paternalistic approach is contrary to the SEND code of
practice (2015) and the emphasis it places on partnership
working, the promotion of pupil and parent voice and au-
tonomy. It is also contrary to the psychologist I want to be.
Yet, parents and teachers who may have waited a long time
to meet with an educational psychologist to help them with
complex issues may have an expectation that a solution will
be offered. The term “positioning” was discussed in several
of our taught sessions during the first few weeks of train-
ing. Davies and Harré (1990) described positioning as “the
discursive process whereby selves are located in conversa-
tions as observably and subjectively coherent participants in
jointly produced story lines. There can be interactive po-
sitioning in which what one person says positions another.
And there can be reflexive positioning in which one positions
oneself” (p. 48).
It is with this newly acquired awareness that I reflect on
a time when I felt I was positioned in a way that caused me
significant discomfort and recognise this as a result of being
positioned contrary to my values.
I return to the primary school where I previ-
ously established that the school would have
had a clearer understanding of the motivations
and goals of Somali parents had they considered
their value systems. This time, the same group
of parents were withdrawing children, particu-
larly girls, from Sex and Relationship Educa-
tion. Again, different value systems fed into
what constitutes a wellbeing outcome. From the
school’s point of view, providing SRE would be
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a beneficent act as it would promote the chil-
dren’s long-term health and wellbeing. The par-
ents considered SRE maleficent as it was per-
ceived to be in contradiction to their beliefs.
Furthermore, they expected me to empathise
with them and endorse their views as they chan-
nelled their complaints through me. But I didn’t
agree with them. I felt that the children were en-
titled to an education that will empower them to
make decisions that are safe and healthy; as an
educator, I could not advocate withholding this
knowledge.
“The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is
amendable to society, is that which concerns others. In the
part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of
course, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind,
the individual is sovereign” (Mill, 1859/1997, p. 48).
It is at difficult times that we recognise what values we
hold in high esteem; for me, autonomy is something I value.
When practising as an educational psychologist, I expect sit-
uations will arise where I will be positioned by others (e.g.,
by a school in opposition to parents) and I will endeavour to
be alert to this, particularly when the positioning of myself
or others risks the subjugation of the voice or interests of a
child or a young person.
Autonomy
It is important for educational psychologists to be reflex-
ive and aware of how their values influence their practice.
The process of writing this paper has brought to the fore a
tension that I was aware that I experience in my personal
life but had not until this point reflected upon how it could
affect my professional practice: the tension between my up-
bringing which prioritised duty and community and my per-
sonal values of freedom and autonomy. As a teenager and a
young adult growing up in England, where dominant value
systems acknowledge happiness as a legitimate goal and in-
dividual freedoms are revered, autonomy became something
I relished. I live a largely autonomous life and I aspire to
the same for the children and young people I work with. But
at times promoting children’s autonomy can be complicated,
particularly when the wishes of parents can take precedence
where young children are concerned.
Charlie is a nine-year-old boy with Duchenne
muscular dystrophy. He lives with his mother
and stepfather. He has not been informed of
his condition as his parents are concerned about
the emotional impact the disclosure would have
on him. They are finding it difficult to come to
terms with his diagnosis and believe that God
could cure him if their faith is strong. Char-
lie enjoys school and has a positive relationship
with his teacher. He is becoming increasingly
frustrated as he struggles with physical tasks; he
can walk unaided and run for a short distance,
although he gets very tired. He is aware that,
instead of improving over time, his ability to
perform physical tasks is deteriorating. He has
started to question why he takes daily medica-
tion. His parents do not want anyone at school
to know of his condition, apart from the head-
teacher and SENDCo. They reported that Char-
lie was seen by a physiotherapist and an occu-
pational therapist and consented to allowing the
school to draw on other professionals’ expertise
to provide for Charlie’s needs in principle. His
class teacher reports that he struggles to concen-
trate and that he is fidgety, he also has social
communication difficulties and struggles to ad-
here to social boundaries. He was back-classed
by one academic year. Charlie recently ran away
from home and was found outside his paternal
grandmother’s house. He disclosed that his step-
father had been locking him up in his bedroom
in the dark and that he wanted to see his birth
father (whom the school wasn’t aware of until
this point). Charlie was also found taking food
from other children’s lunch boxes as he craved
sugary treats. He has been hiding his PE kit to
avoid participating in the lessons. His birth fa-
ther does not know of the diagnosis. Charlie’s
mother and stepfather agreed to an Early Help
Plan.
I was the SENDCo involved in the vignette above. I felt
that, had Charlie been informed of his condition, he could
have had the chance to come to terms with it and made some
decisions about his care. He could be educated to manage
his symptoms and receive help to become more prepared for
changes in the future. What this case highlighted to me was
that at times autonomy and beneficence can compete. In this
case, the parents’ reluctance to engage with health profes-
sionals in order to prevent their son from knowing of his
condition was a safeguarding concern.
With time, they consented to some support; they agreed
to informing key adults in school who could support Charlie
day to day. Charlie, however, still didn’t have an explanation
for his deteriorating physical abilities. I felt Charlie’s rights
were not being respected, and I felt somehow complicit. I
reflect on this case often, particularly since I started train-
ing as an educational psychologist. How would I do things
differently? I don’t have all the answers, but as I took part
in learning activities as a TEP about systemic and narrative
approaches I thought of Charlie’s family. Also, on reflection,
I can now see that Charlie could have been involved in mak-
ing decisions about his school life, and he could have been
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supported to advocate for himself without knowledge of a
diagnosis. Perhaps my own values and beliefs about what
is “right” and paternalism blinded me to the possibilities for
promoting Charlie’s autonomy within his existing situation.
Rule Utilitarianism and Tackling Disadvantage
In contrast with Act Utilitarianism, which focuses on the
consequence of individual actions, Rule Utilitarianism dis-
penses with the need to perform a felicific calculus every
time an action is taken so long as we adhere to rules that we
know, on the whole, maximise utility and minimise unhap-
piness. For example, a society in which a small number of
people may be under threat, for instance, from state-induced
violence could find that this arrangement is threatening to
the majority of citizens’ sense of security, compared to a so-
ciety where rules and laws ensure the security of all citizens.
Knapp (1999) states that rule utilitarianism “would require
rules to protect individuals and minorities . . . the general pro-
tection that every member of society feels will, in the long
run, some argue, create a society that produces greater happi-
ness” (p. 386). This may be true if the issue being considered
is one that any member of society will or could be exposed
to. For example, when considering care for the elderly, we
would all be happier knowing that we will be cared for in
our later years. But this principle overlooks the rights of mi-
nority groups, particularly where acting in ways that increase
utility for them comes at a cost to the majority. For example,
providing for the needs of children with learning disabilities
does not provide happiness to the majority. Indeed, from a
utilitarian perspective, one could argue that the majority of
children would benefit if cash strapped local authorities did
not fund expensive education settings that cater for children
with significant disabilities.
Although I am an advocate of individual freedoms and au-
tonomy, I could not describe myself as a utilitarian. Thanks
to my upbringing, for me, duty and good intentions matter.
I have a strong sense of belonging to my community and a
sense of responsibility towards wider society. My chosen
professions reflect this (teaching and educational psychol-
ogy) and so does my commitment to social justice for all, not
just the majority. In the following parts of the paper, I will
consider how other perspectives of social justice address dis-
advantage, focusing on Rawls’ Theory of Justice and Com-
munitarianism.
Redistributive Social Justice (from a Rawlsian
Perspective)
Rawlsian social justice is concerned with how, despite
having different positions, people can live together in a just
and stable society where:
1. each person is to have an equal right to the most exten-
sive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for
others; and
2. social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two con-
ditions: a) they are to be attached to offices and posi-
tions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity; and b) they are to be to the greatest ben-
efit of the least-advantaged members of society — the
difference principle.
Redistributive models form the basis of several education
policies that redistribute resources such as Pupil Premium
and High Needs funding. Redistribution of power can be
executed through ensuring representation of disenfranchised
groups at decision-making levels within organisations and
addressing power imbalances. Teachers may devote addi-
tional time and harness expertise to provide interventions
aimed at pupils that have been identified as in need of ad-
ditional support. This perspective of social justice strives for
equal outcomes as opposed to equal treatment.
As a postgraduate student working toward an MA in Edu-
cation Policy, I was introduced to redistributive social justice,
and I felt that this perspective agreed with my personal regard
for fairness. At the time, I also taught in London at a school
where many lived in deprivation. I knew, through my studies,
that low socioeconomic status was consistently shown to be
the most salient predictor of educational achievement in the
UK. I felt strongly that something ought to be done to ad-
dress inequality in education and was particularly interested
in issues and debates around class and ethnicity in education.
I felt that redistributive models of social justice offered an
opportunity to redress imbalances in educational outcomes.
The “veil of ignorance position” advocated by Rawls ap-
pealed to my value of fairness. At the time, during the fi-
nancial crisis, significant cuts were introduced to the public
sector, and the role of the state was shrinking; the education
landscape was changing rapidly as a result. These develop-
ments were in contradiction to what I felt were the obliga-
tions of government under a “social contract”. A redistribu-
tive model of social justice was useful in enabling me to crit-
ically analyse the policy developments in the field of edu-
cation. In my day to day practice as an educator, however,
this way of viewing social justice alone was not sufficient in
helping me through some of the ethical and moral dilemmas
I faced in my direct work with children and families.
For example, when I worked as a class teacher, I recall
a discussion with a teaching assistant who complained that
children who didn’t adhere to the school’s behaviour expec-
tation got more rewards and attention than children who con-
sistently followed the rules. She referred to one of my stu-
dents with SEMH needs, whom I will call Ali, and lamented
the amount of time and effort spent on keeping him in school.
That same afternoon, during a Circle Time discussion with
the children in my class, one child commented that he was
happy because Ali was being “good” and that they’d played
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well together at break time. A conversation followed about
how Ali had changed with several children making positive
comments. What the children in that cohesive class had felt
was not that they’d been somehow disadvantaged by the ad-
ditional attention Ali required, but that they were pleased for
Ali. When I think of that class, I recognise that, although Ali
had taken a lot of my attention and time and that of the other
adults, the whole class gained from the inclusive ethos. They
felt cared for, and they showed care to one another. This
wasn’t redistribution; everyone gained. I recognise that the
realities of the classroom have changed since; many teachers
no longer expect to have additional adults, and exclusions
figures are at a record high. But what I did know about this
school is that it did not just redistribute resources, the leader-
ship consciously worked to create an inclusive ethos. There
was a collective sense of responsibility for the children in our
care and the school and the community worked well together.
It was a community school.
When I took on a job as a specialist teacher, visiting dif-
ferent schools in my local authority, and later, when I moved
to a different local authority in a similar role, I noticed over
time that some schools were more open to accommodating
and including children with diverse needs than other schools
with similar resources. And, as a visiting professional offer-
ing advice and guidance, I was aware that these schools were
better at implementing advice from professionals and follow-
ing through with actions. In order to effectively promote so-
cial justice as an educational psychologist, I will need to be
aware of organisational values and consider how to build ca-
pacity in teams to work for social justice. I expect that further
ahead in my educational psychology training and practice I
will consider the workings of organisations and gain skills in
this area. My experience so far and discussions with tutors
suggest that leadership is key.
Communitarian Social Justice
According to this perspective on social justice, each mem-
ber of a community has responsibilities to the rest, and the
community has a responsibility to each of its members. A
just society, therefore, requires responsible individuals and a
responsive community. Communitarianism emphasises the
“common good”, in contrast with liberal perspectives on so-
cial justice, such as utilitarianism, which emphasise individ-
ual goals. Perhaps this perspective of social justice is the one
that I feel is most aligned with the way I have conducted my-
self as a professional working within a community to further
the education and welfare of the least advantaged. I have
been most effective when I have worked well with other pro-
fessionals and parents. The responsiveness of the commu-
nity to the needs of its member would, according to this per-
spective, ameliorate the effects of disadvantage. Critics of
communitarianism would suggest that membership of com-
munities can be oppressive and limit individual liberties. A
further concern is that the overreliance on communities can
diminish the role of formal institutions in providing for the
needs of the least advantaged. Not all communities have the
same resources and capabilities. Furthermore, not everyone
belongs to a community.
Essam is a 7-year-old boy with spina bifida. He
is able to walk short distances unaided, and he
requires regular clean intermittent catheterisa-
tion, including during the school day. Essam
speaks English as an additional language, and
he has a speech and language difficulty. He is
able to access a carefully differentiated curricu-
lum within his Year 2 mainstream classroom.
His class teacher reported that he is beginning
to make progress academically, but he is increas-
ingly socially isolated as he struggles to keep up
with his peers at playtime. He wears a nappy but
feels embarrassed about this. On the advice of
a urologist, Essam’s mother requested that the
school catheterises Essam during the school day
but the headteacher feels that this request is be-
yond what the school can provide.
This vignette describes a case in which I felt least able
to help because of the absence of a collective sense of re-
sponsibility. Again, I was a SENDCo involved with the case.
My attempts to co-ordinate Essam’s health needs fell in the
gap between the Health and Education systems. Although
health professionals were available to give advice and offer
training on how to perform clean intermittent catheterisation,
they were not able to allocate a health professional to perform
daily CIC at school; this was considered to be the school’s
responsibility. On the other hand, the headteacher could not
insist that school staff took on this role. Essam’s mother, a
single mother of four children who did not speak English and
had recently enrolled at an ESOL class, was forced to quit in
order to come to school on a daily basis to catheterise her
son. That did not seem just. Perhaps an alternative system
guided by communitarian principles would bridge the gap
between individual services to respond to the needs of chil-
dren with physical disabilities in mainstream schools. But I
also suspect that some redistribution of power (through ad-
vocacy for example) would redress the balance in favour of
Essam’s mother so that she could fight for more adequate
support. Often parents who have a limited understanding of
SEND systems and don’t possess the “correct” forms of cul-
tural capital can be most disadvantaged in a complex educa-
tion system that is poorly funded.
Conclusions
Lindsey (2017) suggested that EPs need to consider eth-
ical principles, their own values and those of others and
use these to develop an ethical decision-making framework
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which can be integrated with problem-solving frameworks.
He recommends that EPs undergo this process from day one
of their training in preparation for the wide range of issues
and ethical dilemmas they are likely to face.
I considered three perspectives on social justice: Utilitar-
ianism, Rawlsian Redistribution and Communitarianism. I
started with the intention of finding one perspective that is
closely aligned with my values and envisaged that I would
refer to it when faced with ethical dilemmas. In truth, I was
almost certain that a Rawlsian perspective would be the one.
After all, in my previous studies, I had considered social
justice at length and applied Rawlsian principles to policy
dilemmas. But the emphasis on practice that educational psy-
chology demands, and particularly ethical practice, calls for
a more nuanced and reflexive approach. I found that no sin-
gle perspective on social justice could prevail in the face of
the complex and varied casework of an educational psychol-
ogist. I have also learnt that, in the pursuit of social justice,
different values can compete and the question of “who is the
client?” is ever present.
I have realised that despite perceived tensions between my
upbringing, which favoured duty, and my choice to pursue
individual goals, both the values of my childhood and those
that I acquired later in life can and do coexist. Furthermore,
they can be applied to the benefit of children and families in
my work as an educational psychologist.
Through thinking reflexively of my values and how they
are played out, and critically engaging with moral principles
and theories of social justice, I have seen new understandings
emerge when revisiting dilemmas from the past. I aim to ap-
ply a similar process to the complex casework I am likely to
encounter and to the ethical problems I will face as I strive to
become the ethically minded educational psychologist I wish
to be.
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